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JOINT CUSTODY AS NORM:
SOLOMON REVISITED0
By ALISON HARVSON YOUNG*
Most jurisdictions in Canada and the United States
have, to a greater or lesser extent, endorsed the notion
of joint custody in recent years. The author suggests
that-the move toward joint custody has resulted from a
combination of two major factors: the notion of
parental equality and the application of the best
interests of the child test. The growing prominence of
equal parental rights has created a strong temptation to
approach custody as a Solomonic exercise in dividing
the children equally between those with equal rights
over them. The indeterminacy of the best interests test
may readily encourage custody determinations on this
basis as wel. Joint custody has been received less
enthusiastically in Canada than in the United States.
The author suggests that the tendency of the Supreme
Court of Canada to reject the sameness of treatment
approach to equality may weil explain this.
Dans des ann6es r6centes, la plupart des juridictions au
Canada et aux Ittats-Unis ont adopt6, A diff6rents
degr6s, la notion de la garde conjointe. L'auteure
suggare que l'avance vers la garde conjointe r6sulto
d'un combinaison de deux facteurs majeurs: la notion
de l'Egalit6 parentale et l'application du test qui met
l'accent sur les meileurs int6r~ts de l'enfant. La
pr6dominance croissant des droits 6gaux des parents a
dorn6 lieu A une forte tendance A traiter la question de
la garde des enfants comme un exercice de Solomon qui
consiste dans le partage 6gal des enfants entre ceux qui
ont des droits sur les enfants. Aussi, le test bas6 sur Its
meilleurs int6rats de l'enfant est si ind6terminatif qu'fi
peut encourager que les d6terminations de garde
soient faites de cette fagon.
La notion de la garde conjointe a 6t6 regue avec moins
d'enthousiasme au Canada qu'aux Atats-Unis.
L'auteure sugg~re cette diff6rence s'explique par Ia
tendance de la Cour supreme du Canada i rejeter la
tWorie de l'Cgalit6 fonde sur lo traitement pareil.
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I. INTRODUMTTON
Some authors have observed in recent years that "joint custody is
sweeping the country." Although such statements generally refer to the
United States, joint custody has also been an influential notion in Canada.2
Whatever one might think of it, joint custody has struck a chord with policy-
makers, legislators, and judges across both countries. Given the traditional
vision of the law as resistant to reform and slow to change, that legislators
have actually changed laws to accommodate joint custody is a remarkable
phenomenon.3
This paper will focus upon the ideological explanations underlying
this "sweep," and will consider whether these explanations apply as well to
Canada as to the United States. I will argue, after considering some other
possible explanations, that the ideology of equality, and particularly the
American vision of equality as sameness, underlies the appeal of joint
custody. Equality has moulded our ideas of the best interests of the child
test, which judges use to determine custody, and not the other way around.
The inherent indeterminacy of the best interests test has also been a key
factor in reinforcing the ideology of equality and joint custody; in the
absence of legal devices that really help a judge to decide between the
parents (such as the tender years doctrine, a maternal presumption 4), the
1 See J.B. Singer & W.L Reynolds, "A Dissent on Joint Custody" (1988) 47 Md. L Rev. 497 at 497
and 512. M. McKnight, in "Issues and Trends in the Law of Joint Custody" in J. Folberg, ed., Joint
Custody and Shared Parnting, 2d ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 1991) 209 at 209 writes that "[loint
custody has swept the country, leaving few family law codes and practices untouched." For a table of
American legislation concerning joint custody, see J. Folberg, ed., ibid, Appendix A at 297.
2 In the United States, the major legislative initiatives injoint custody were undertaken in the early
1980s. Although several states have taken a second look at and have, in some cases, softened their joint
custody provisions following psychological studies (discussed below) and legislative task forces (for
example, the California State Senate Task Force on Family Equity, June 1987), the fact remains that
joint custody has continued to exert a forceful influence over the law and over judicial interpretation.
3 The trend has also been influential in Britain. Although it must be acknowledged that, under
the ChildenAct (U.K), 1989, c. 3, there is no such thing as joint custody, or even custody, British law still
seeks to encourage joint parental involvement and gives the non-residential parents the right to
information regarding the child so that they may participate in the decision-making process: see P.M.
Bromley & N.V. Love, FaiilyLaw, 8th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1992) at 333-34.
4 The tender years doctrine created a presumption in the case law in favour of maternal custody
when all other factors were equal and when the child in question was under approximately seven years
of age. S.B. Boyd, "From Gender Specificity to Gender Neutrality? Ideology in Canadian Child
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option of giving custody to both may be an attractive way out of often
agonizing dilemmas. I will also suggest that, although equality has been a
very important value in Canada in recent years, the core of the ideology of
equality is taking on a shape very different from the sameness of
treatment vision, which prevails in the United States. The heart of equality
in Canada is increasingly seen as a remedial notion,5 which readily
recognizes difference and is concerned with trying to remove the effects of
difference and disadvantage. The implication for joint custody is that,
where equality may incorporate difference, the notion that mothers and
fathers should be treated as though they were the same and the notion that
the law should see them as having equal shares over the child has a less
potent normative appeal.
The term "joint custody" encompasses a number of different
arrangements.6 Joint legal custody refers to the notion that the parents,
following a separation, will share decision-making authority for major
decisions with respect to the education, healthcare, and religious upbringing
of the children. It does not, at least in principle, presuppose any particular
division of living arrangements. 7 Joint physical custody refers to a divided
living arrangement, which generally involves alternating periods of
residence between the parents. Although the division need not be equal,
joint physical custody differs from an agreement for "generous access" in
two ways. First, the parents generally both provide homes for the child; the
child keeps a room and personal effects in both houses. Second, the time
division is more equal than in the traditional access arrangement. For
example, in some cases the custody arrangement allows the child to
alternate weeks, months, or even years between parental homes. In other
cases, the arrangement allows the child to divide the week, and spend, for
example, Wednesday to Saturday with one parent and Thursday to
Custody Law" in C. Smart & S. Sevenhuijsen, eds, Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (London:
Routledge, 1989) 126 at 130.
5 McIntyre J. alludes to the "remedial component" of equality in Andrews v. Law Society of
Bdish Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 171 [hereinafterAndrews].
6 J.B. Singer & W.L. Reynolds, supra note 1 at 503, underline the distinction between joint
physical and joint legal custody. J. Folberg, in "Custody Overview" in Joint Custody and Shared
Parenting, supra note 1 at 5-7, begins with an overview in which he sets out useful definitions.
7 Recent studies have found that "joint legal custody" may not differ significantly in practice from
the more traditional "sole custody and reasonable access" situation. See, for example, C.R. Albiston,
E.E. Maccoby & R.H. Mnookin, "Does Joint Legal Custody Matter" (1990) Stan. Law & PoL Rev. at
167, which found that one and a half years after divorce, fathers with joint legal custody do not see their
children more often, cooperate more with their former wives, nor participate more in decisions regarding
their children's lives. This study became part of the larger work, E.E. Maccoby & R.H. Mnookin,
Dividing the Child (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
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Sunday with the other.8 Joint physical custody is much less common than
joint legal custody. One recent study from California, which has led the way
in introducing and encouraging joint custody, indicates that 79 per cent of
divorced parents with children had joint legal custody decrees; of these, only
20 per cent had joint physical custody as wellY
The term "joint custody" is ambiguous in another important aspect:
it does not indicate whether joint custody, legal or physical, arose by
agreement between the parties or by the imposition of a court order, in spite
of the opposition of one or both parents.10 More recent writing and
empirical studies on joint custody support the contention that the difference
is a crucial one. Indeed, the earlier studies, which presented optimistic
pictures of joint custody, were based on samples of subjects who had agreed
to joint custody. Increasingly, authors are proposing that joint custody
should never be imposed, at least when the parents cannot agree, that a
primary caretaker presumption should be applied. -U
II. EXPLAINING THE APPEAL OF JOINT CUSTODY
A. The Social Science Explanation
At least until quite recently, most proponents defended joint custody
as "scientifically proven" to be in the best interests of the child. They would
8 Colwellv. Colwell (1992), 38 R.F.L (3d) 345 at 349 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter Cohyell] offers a
succinct statement of current law on divided custody:.
To find [divided custody to be] in.the best interests of any child would require more to be
shown than ... [that] mere decision making is to be shared. The benefits of the security of one
home, one set of routines, and one set of expectations are significant; it would be an
exceptional case where the sacrifice of these benefits would be justified in the best interests of
the child.
The judge in Colwell cites Professor James McLeod, in his annotation to Parsons v. Parsons
(1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 83 at 84 (Nfld. Unif. Fain. Ct.) [hereinafter Parsons], for the proposition that
recent mental health literature questions whether joint custody is as beneficial as was initially imagined.
9 Albiston, Maccoby & Mnookin, supra note 7 at 167. California law explicitly splits the notion
of joint custody into joint legal and joint physical custody. see Cal. Faro. Code § 3003-04 (West 1995).
10 For a discussion of these divisions, see LJ. Weitzman, The Divorce Revoluion: The Unexpected
Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America (New York. The Free Press,
1985) at 245-47.
11 See, generally, P. Bookspan, "From a Tender Years Presumption to a Primary Parent
Presumption: Has Anything Really Changed? .. Should it?" (1994) 8 B.Y.U. J. of Pub. Law 75.
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almost invariably cite the Wallerstein and Kelly study12 and others, which
suggest that children who maintained relationships with the non-custodial
parent tended to adjust better to life after divorce than those who did not.
3
However, the research has simply been too equivocal and inconsistent to
have driven the changes in attitude that took place towards joint custody. A
psychologist from McGill University made the point effectively in a recent
paper:
Unfortunately, the research is plagued by numerous methodological problems, namely the
lack of longitudinal research, small and nonrepresentative samples, and the lack of rigorous
control over specific arrangements (eg family situations with joint legal custody are virtually
indistinguishable from family situations with sole custody; Brown 1984, Arditti, 1992).
Moreover, investigations of joint custody most frequently employ joint legal custody
arrangements, resulting in very limited implications or erroneous conclusions about joint
residential custody (Emery, 1988). This remains the most remarkable limitation in this research
area. Nevertheless, since the passage of the Federal DivorceAct in 1985, Canadian courts
appear to be increasingly in favour of joint custody and support their decision by drawing
upon available, yet inconclusive data (Irving & Benjamin, 1987). In policy formation, this is a
clear cut case of putting the cart before the horse.i
4
In addition, writers tended to cite the early research of authors such
as Wallerstein and Kelly by interpreting their findings too generally. For
example, in Surviving the Breakup Wallerstein and Kelly recommended
joint lega4 not joint physical custody, and yet, proponents of joint physical
custody often cite their work. Moreover, Wallerstein has insisted that the
study never recommended the imposition of joint physical custody on
parents without their complete agreement. 15 In general, policy-makers
have seized the well-established proposition that children generally do best
after divorce when they maintain relationships with both parents, and
jumped to the conclusion that joint physical custody is the optimal way of
achieving this.
12 J.S. Wallerstein & J.B. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope with
Divorce (New York. Basic Books, 1980).
3 See Singer & Reynolds, supra note 1, for a critical discussion of some of the research and the
inferences that have been drawn. Singer and Reynolds criticize the "unjustified leap from the common
sense proposition that children do better after divorce if they maintain frequent contact with both
parents to the startling conclusion that joint custody is the only way to ensure such contact. Neither
logic nor data support this leap": ibid. at 502. See R.F. Cochran, Jr., "Reconciling the Primary
Caretaker Preference and the Joint Custody Preference" in Folberg, supra note 1, 231 for a discussion
of a study which suggests that too much contact can be counter-productive. Cochran states that "[it
may be that children benefit from more contact with the less-seen parent than is provided by traditional
visitation, but that the benefits of increased access ... are subject to diminishing marginal returns."
14 L Kurtz & J. Derevensky, "Child Custody and Public Policy- Issues, Questions and Answers"
(paper presented at the Second International Conference for the Child, Organization for the
Protection of Children's Rights, Montreal, October 1992).
15 As cited in MA. Mason, The Equality Trap (NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 1988) at 82.
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What conclusions, if any, arise from the research to date? First,
subsequent research has greatly qualified the early research, which
appeared to show joint custody (whether legal or physical) as a positive
arrangement for children. The most obvious qualifier of the early
Wallerstein and Kelly work (in addition to their recommendation of joint
legal custody but not joint physical custody) was that their sample included
only families that had agreed to joint custody. This is of crucial importance
because the research repeatedly identifies conflict between parents as a
strong negative indicator for the adjustment of children following divorce.
In such situations, a custody arrangement which forces warring parties to
co-parent is likely to intensify the conflict in which the children are involved. 16
While many jurisdictions are reluctant to order custody in the absence of
spousal agreement, this factor has arguably not been given the legal
importance which it deserves1 7 Is the mere consent of the parties to a joint
legal custody order sufficient, or should a court seek satisfactory proof that
the parents really are able to cooperate in the upbringing of their children?
Second, joint legal custody may not, in the result, mean very much as
a practical matter. It may frequently have the attributes of the traditional
arrangement: sole custody to the mother with generous access to the
father. Maccoby and Mnookin found no significant effects of joint custody
on the level of non-resident fathers' contact or support.18 Similarly, they did
not find that joint custody increased their involvement in decision-making,
reporting that "where the children had one primary residence, it was usually
16 Although there have been many problems with empirical research on the subject of joint
custody, there is a consensus on one important point: involvement in parental conflict has very negative
effects on children. Forcing a greater degree of sharing between two warring spouses increases the
amount of conflict and increases the exposure of the children to the conflict. F. Furstenberg & AJ.
Cherlin, in Divided Families: What Happens to Children When Parents Part (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1991) at 75 write: "The admittedly limited evidence so far suggests to us that
custody arrangements may matter less for the well-being of the children ... than the two factors we noted
earlier, how much conflict there is between the parents and how effectively the parent (or parents) the
child lives with functions ... Even the frequency of visits with a father seems to matter less than the
climate in which they take place." Dr. Richard A. Gardner, a professor of Child Psychiatry at Columbia
University, warns: "Joint custody is a terrible compromise for warring parents. When recommended in
such situations, what may actually result is a no-custody arrangement that is merely called joint custody.
Neither parent has power or control, and the children find themselves in a no-man's-land exposed to
their parents' crossfire and available to both as weapons. The likelihood of children developing a
psychological problem in such a situation is practically 100 percent": see RA. Gardner, "Joint Custody is
Not For Everyone" (1982) 5 Farn. Advoc. 7 at 9.
17 Maccoby and Mnookin, supra note 7 at 210, noted the importance of parental conflict as a
factor in the adjustment of children after divorce. They also observed that prior to their work, no
documentation existed that addressed the nature and extent of communication between divorced
parents concerning the children.
18 /bil at 289.
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the residential parent who took primary decision-making responsibility." 9
Third, joint physical custody may put children at risk when there is
substantial parental conflict. Unlike joint legal custody, it does make a
difference. When children are going back and forth between two homes
frequently, parents, especially of very young children, must interact, and
parental conflict in such circumstances will almost inevitably affect the
children detrimentally. 2o
Finally, one of the most interesting aspects of Maccoby and
Mnookin's important study is the gendered theme, which emerged from
their work. In approximately 70 per cent of the families studied, the children
lived with their mothers, although the children typically saw their fathers
fairly regularly. In only one of six families were the living arrangements
more evenly balanced. In these families, the children spent between one-
third and one-half of their residential time with each parent over a typical
two-week period. Even in these cases, the children spent the bulk of their
residential time with their mothers. The researchers found only
approximately 10 per cent of cases where the children lived with their
fathers. Moreover, the patterns of residence change revealed a
phenomenon, which has been dubbed "mother drift," the major attributes of
which are:
1. Mother-residential households were more stable, with fewer
changes than either dual-residence or father-residence households;
and
2 when a residential move of either parent triggered a change in the
children's residence, they almost always moved into the mother's
household rather than the father's.
The custodial provisions of the legal decree were relatively powerless in the
face of this phenomenon:
When we compared the custodial provisions of the legal decree with the actual residence of
the children, we found that the decree can function to confirm mother residence if it exists
initially and to bring it about if it does not exist initially, but that the decree was much less
powerful in moving children out of maternal residence once it was established.
2!
19 Md.
2 Ibid. at 284.
2 1bia&
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The authors conclude that these findings suggest that "there is a strong
inertial pull-based on social custom rather than law-toward mother
residence." 7,
The conclusions, which have emerged from the recent empirical
research culminating in Maccoby and Mnookin's recent work, do not provide
any justification for the broad changes in policy embraced by many
jurisdictions. As Maccoby and Mnookin have written,
Although in the aggregate data we found no evidence to support claims for the positive or
negative effects ofjoint legal custody, it is important to emphasize that this does not preclude
such effects in some families over the longer term. Nevertheless, it appears that joint legal
custody is neither the solution to the problem of maintaining the involvement of divorced
fathers, nor a catalyst for either increasing or softening conflict in divorcing families. Broad
claims either advocating or condemning joint legal custody therefore seem unwarrante 23
[emphasis added].
In short, despite the lack of solid empirical footing, joint custody found a very
receptive audience among policy-makers during the 1980s. 24 There was
little such empirical evidence then and there is little now. Moreover, the
argument that joint custody is an effective way of getting fathers more
involved has not been borne out, as Maccoby and Mnookin's results
indicate.25 Joint custody has not lived up to its promise of making parents
more equal. While it has not made fathers more "equal" in the daily lives of
their children, there is a good argument that the rhetoric of parental
equality and joint custody has masked and discounted the dominant role
that mothers continue to play in child-rearing. For example, Fineman
asserts that the modern vision of gender neutrality in custody
determinations has favoured fathers: "It removes, by labelling them
gendered, the things women typically tend to do for children, which are
grouped under the term 'nurture.' Neutrality in this regard, in the context of
an active and operating gendered system of lived social roles, is anti-
22 bd. at 270. "Although our study has not examined the impact of co-parental conflict on
children, follow-up work in the context of the Stanford Child Custody Study as well as the research of
the others strongly suggests that such conflict can create grave risks for children": ibid.
23 Ibid. at 289. The authors, however, state that they would "cautiously support a presumption in
favor of joint legal custody largely on symbolic grounds." They further assert that "[Joint legal custody
will not make divorced parents equal partners in the lives of their children, but it does affirm the idea
that in the eyes of the law fathers should play a continuing role in their children's lives despite the
divorce": ibid.
X In fact, social science can be seen as part of the larger social and ideological movement that
created the climate that has fostered joint custody. See M. Fineman, "Custody Determination at
Divorce: The Limits of Social Science Research and the Fallacy of the Liberal Ideology of Equality"
(1989) 3 CJ.W.L 88 at 100-07.
25 Supra note 18 and 19 and accompanying text.
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maternal and is hardly gender neutral in its impact." 26 There is also
considerable anecdotal evidence to suggest that joint custody is a useful
means for the reduction or elimination of child support if the determination
of support is based on the assumption that when parents share custody,
they pay support in proportion to the time the children spend in their care.
Apart from the problem that women earn less money and yet still must
maintain a household large enough for their children, the mother drift
phenomenon revealed by Maccoby and Mnookin 27 adds another element of
unfairness. Once support amounts are set on the basis of equal time,
amounts payable to the mother are, in practice, unlikely to be revised
upwards as the living arrangements become less "equal." A final
illustration of the risks of the joint custody rhetoric for women is the role it
can have in settlement discussions. Although Maccoby and Mnookin
mention that no empirical evidence exists to support the claim that women
often agree to joint custody out of fear of losing support,28 considerable
anecdotal evidence suggests that they may often do so. Mary Ann Mason,
for example, tells of a California attorney representing mostly men who
admitted to her that "[a]bout sixty percent of my male clients ask for joint
custody now, but only about ten percent really want it. It's a good
bargaining position." 29 In this sense, women have been subordinated by the
discourse of parental equality and joint custody. Although the implicit social
norm remains one of mother custody, the explicit legal norm significantly
understates the reality. The fact that women are no longer presumptively
entitled to custody has had a disempowering effect, particularly as it has
been the one arena in which women have had some real control.
30 As I
have indicated, it is my argument that the appeal of the ideology of equality
has been central to the popularity of joint custody to policy-makers and
jurists. This, however, does not render irrelevant another crucial and
related factor: the problems inherent in the best interests of the child
standard.3 /
26 M. Fineman, "The Politics of Custody and Gender. Child Advocacy and the Transformation
of Custody Decision Making in the U.S.A." in Smart & Sevenhuijsen, supra note 4,27 at 34.
27 Maccoby and Mnookin, supra note 7 at 96 and 197. See also above at 791.
23 IN&£ at 1I.
29 Mason, supra note 15 at 83.
30 C. Smart, "Power and the Politics of Child Custody" in Smart & Sevenhijsen, supra note 4 at 19.
31 Another explanation is the need-recognized by most writers-for a custody test far easier to
apply, and more economic than the current best interests of the child standard. See M. Fineman, supra
note 26 at 27-28; and R.F. Cochran, Jr., "Reconciling the Primary Caretaker Preference, the Joint
Custody Preference, and the Case-by-Case Rule" in Folberg, supra note 1 at 218.
19941
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B. The Effect of the Best Interests Standard
As many authors have pointed out, the removal of the tender years
doctrine, along with any presumptions that prefer one parent over the
other, and its replacement with the "best interests" test for the allocation of
custody has had some serious effects. First, it has led to a higher level of
indeterminacy regarding custody decisions.3 2 Second, it has rendered the
decision much more difficult and time-consuming for judges to make. As
Mary Ann Mason has written,
the abolition of the presumption in favour of mothers as the best custodians for young
children has left only the vague guideline of the "best interests" of the child. Our society
lacks any clear-cut national consensus on what the best interests of the child are, and the
judge must make a determination based on a confusing legislative laundry list of factors to
consider. Not only does this make it difficult for the judge to make a decision, it encourages
litigation, since the determination is unpredictable. As noted, it also leaves the door open for
custody blackmail.
33
As Maccoby and Mnookin have observed, very few custody cases
actually go to court as contested matters. Nevertheless, some evidence
suggests that the litigation rates are higher in jurisdictions that have the best
interests standard, rather than presumptions.34 Moreover, it is very difficult
to assess the extent to which the fear of losing custody of her child may lead
a mother to bargain away her property or child support entitlements, or to
agree to forms of access or joint custody that she might not otherwise be
willing to do. In other words, there is some reason to exercise caution in
assuming that mothers, even early in the process of breakdown, freely
enter into agreements for joint custody, however consensual the agreement
appears.
It is important to recognize, as Mary Ann Mason has done, that the
best interests test can be seen, at least in part, as an expression of the
equality rights of the parents. Although the best interests test appears to be
child-centred, it has emerged as the determining standard at least partly as
a gender-neutral standard of parental rights to replace maternal
preference. The rhetoric of equality contributed to the development of the
best interests test; the indeterminacy of the best interests test, reinforced
32 Maccoby and Mnookin doubt whether the test is really so problematic. They argue, supra
note 7 at 282, that the strength of the social norm that mothers are the primary custodians for children
and the preference for primary custodians gives the test less indeterminacy for most parents than it seems
to have. Some other studies have examined comparative litigation rates and found that they are higher
in jurisdictions with best interest tests, as opposed to, for example, the primary caretaker presumptions.
-V M. A. Mason, "The De-regulation of Family Law: In Whose Best Interests?" (1993) 3:2 The
Responsive Community. Rights and Responsibilities.
34 See generally Bookspan, supra note 11.
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once again by the ideology of equality, rendered the Solomonic solution of
joint custody very appealing to jurists. Put another way, the combination of
ideology and practical reality set the stage for the joint custody trend. The
point is illustrated by an American custody decision quoted by Mary Ann
Mason:
Joint custody is an appealing concept. It permits the court to escape an agonizing choice, to
keep from wounding the self-esteem of either parent and to avoid the appearance of
discrimination between the sexes. Joint custody allows parents to have an equal voice in
making decisions and it recognizes the advantage of shared responsibility for raising the
young. But serious questions remain to be answered: how does joint custody affect the
children? What are the factors to be considered and weighed? 35
C. Equality as the Force Behind Joint Custody
The suggestion that the central explanation behind the joint custody
boom has to do with the pervasive appeal of the ideology of equality is
neither earth-shattering nor novel. The feminist critiques of equality theory
are powerful, and I suspect, familiar to this audience and I will not review
them here. 36 My examination of the issue with a specifically Canadian
focus will include a few points about the equality climate in Canada, about
the treatment of joint custody in Canada as opposed to the United States,
and about the potential impact of the developing concept of equality as
recently applied in other related areas of family law.
D. The Equality Climate in Canada
In 1982, when the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 7
came to life, the Canadian constitutional and legal landscape assumed a
much greater similarity to American legal culture than had existed
previously. For the first time, the Supreme Court of Canada found itself
looking more frequently to the United States Supreme Court than across
the Atlantic to the House of Lords. As will be discussed below, however,
Canadian law has by no means slavishly followed the precedents developed
35 Supra note 15 at 81. See also Dodd v. Dodd, 403 N.Y.S. 2d 401 at 402 (1978).
35 See, for example, M. F'meman, The Illusion of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce
Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified:
Disclosures on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); and Smart, supra
note 30.
37 Part I of the ConstiufionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter the Charfer.
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south of the border. The Charter has captured the imaginations and hearts
of Canadians, and the notion of equality is one of the principal ideologies
reflected in it. Section 15,38 which also contains a clause permitting
affirmative action,39 has been subject to remarkably little direct judicial
interpretation so far, at least by the Supreme Court of Canada, but the
notion of equality is clearly an important ideology. 40 Canadian feminists
have had high hopes for section 15 as containing the seeds of a substantive
vision of equality, while father's rights lobbyists have tried to harness the
persuasive power of equality (as sameness of treatment) in their attempts
to promote joint custody reforms. Equality, as elusive a concept as it may
be, has become a powerful symbol and force for Canadians. Its simplest
version is sameness of treatment: parents are equal, parents have equal
rights over their children, and parents should be treated equally after
separation or divorce. Joint custody, at least at first glance, is very
compatible with this version. But if this were the whole story, one might
expect Canadian judges and policy-makers to endorse joint custody as
enthusiastically as their American counterparts. This is not happening. The
reason in my view derives from a fundamental difference in the ideology of
equality as it is emerging in Canada, as opposed to the version which has
emerged and which remains dominant in the United States.
Historically, Canadians have not been as "rights" oriented or as
individual oriented as Americans. 41 Americans essentially linked this
3- Section 15 of the Charter came into effect on 17 April 1985.
39 Section 15(2) of the Charer reads: "Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or
activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability."
40 The Supreme Court has revisited its decision in Andrews, supra note 5, in cases such as
Dickason v. University ofAlberta, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103 [hereinafterDickason ] (mandatory retirement);
Canada v. Schachter, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (maternity and paternity benefits); Gdngreux v. R., [1992]
S.C.R. 259 (whether equality rights are respected by court martial procedure); Mc/Mnney v. University of
Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483 (mandatory retirement); Vancouver General Hospital v. Stoffman, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 483 (mandatory retirement); and R.v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (differences between provinces
in criminal procedure). It is also important to note that some of the most significant equality cases,
particularly those concerning women, have not been Chafer cases. See, for example, Lavalte v. R,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 [hereinafter Lava i e], whose central issue was the interpretation of the Criminal
Code provisions on self-defence where a battered woman who kills her abusive spouse. See also
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Human Rights Commission ), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, where
interpretation of the statutory remedial powers of the Canadian Human Rights Commission was in
issue.
41 A recent indication of this is the generous interpretation given to section 1 of the Charter
(Section I functions to preserve laws which otherwise have been found to offend the Charter, if to
preserve them "can be demonstrablyjustified in a free and democratic society"). See Dickason, ibid.; R
v. Wholesale Travel Group, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154; andR. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452. An interesting
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individualism to the notion of equality that has developed in their country.
As Colleen Sheppard has written,
U.S. constitutional law takes as its starting premise the idea that equality means sameness of
treatment. To be treated equally is to be treated the same. It asserts that all individuals
should be treated the same and not treated differently because of unfair or discriminatory
attitudes or stereotypes about the abilities or talents of the groups to which individuals
belong. This is presented as the "neutral" starting point of legal equality. Integral to the
sameness of treatment premise is a focus on equality as a process or procedure as opposed to
a result or a condition. 42
According to Sheppard, the emphasis upon sameness of treatment was a
response to the injustices of slavery and the subordination of Blacks. By
way of illustration, she cites Justice Harlan's dissent in P/essy v. Ferguson:
Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved.43
Although, as Sheppard goes on to explain, subsequent historical
developments44 have placed a great deal of pressure on this paradigm,
sameness of treatment remains the central and defining core of the
American ideology of equality.4
The development of the constitutional notion of equality in Canada
is taking place in a very different context. As Sheppard observes,
[i]n the United States context, racial integration was an important component of the struggle
towards racial equality. In Canada ... we see precisely the opposite concern. The struggle for
equality for francophone minorities outside of Quebec has been a struggle not for
integration, which would spell assimilation, but for the right to education in separate schools.
This example may also illustrate a greater receptivity in Canada to collective or group rights
comment on the last case is J. Cameron, "Abstract Principle v. Contextual Conceptions of Harm: A
Commenton R.v. uter" (1992) 37 McGill I. 1135.
42 C. Sheppard, "Equality in Context: Judicial Approaches in Canada and the United States"
(1990) 39 U.N.B.J. 111 at 113.
43, W at 114. See P/ersy v. Feiaguon, 163 US. 537 at 559 (S.C. 1896).
44 See ibid. where the author remarks on "the emergence of the modem regulatory state following
the depression. Inherent in this task of legislating was classification and differential treatment."
4 There is hope for the relaxation of the rather formal notion of equality in the United States. S.
Foster, in "Difference and Equality. A Critical Assessment of the 'Concept of Diversity'" (1993) Wis. L
Rev. 105, assesses the concept of diversity as it has been used by courts as a justification for affirmative
action policies. She indicates that courts are increasingly accepting diversity and therefore recognizing
differences. Many in the United States fear, however, that society will be permanently defined and
structured according to race.
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in contrast to what I argue is a predominantly individualistic approach in the United
States.46
In other words, recognition and accomodation of difference has been
central to the development of equality ideology in Canada, and this
example contains two of its key concerns. First, it is concerned with the
social and historical disadvantage that certain groups and individuals may
experience, and second, the emphasis is on resulting disadvantage, rather
than on difference or distinction alone. As many writers have suggested,
the political and legal culture of Canada is more receptive to the notions of
community or social rights than is the political and legal culture of the United
States.g
The leading case to date on the articulation of the section 15(1)
equality guarantee is the Andrews decision. 48 In that case, the Supreme
Court had to consider the constitutionality of provincial legislation which
imposed a citizenship requirement for the practice of law, and in doing so,
the Court rejected the "similarly situated" test. McIntyre J. held that the
language of section 15 of the Charter was deliberately chosen to avoid
some of the problems with the Canadian Bill of Rights. 49 For example, the
Supreme Court had concluded in Bliss v. Canada (AG.), 50 a case argued
under the Canadian Bill of Rights, that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy did not violate the guarantee of equality before the law because
it was not discrimination based on sex. In a frequently cited passage from
Andrews, McIntyre J. stated that,
[ilt must be recognized, however, as well that the promotion of equality under s. 15 has a
much more specific goal than the mere elimination of distinctions. If the Charter was
intended to eliminate all distinctions, then there would be no place for sections such as 27
(multicultural heritage); 2(a) (freedom of conscience and religion); 25 (aboriginal rights and
freedoms); and other such provisions designed to safeguard certain distinctions. Moreover,
the fact that identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality is recognized in s.
15(2), which states that the equality rights in s. 15(1) do 'not preclude any law, program or
46 Supra note 42 at 111. See also Madame Justice B. McLachlin, "The Role of the Court in the
Post- Charer Era. Policy-Maker or Adjudicator?" (1990) 39 U.N.B.LJ. 43.
47 See, for example, R.M. Elliot, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Section I-The Erosion of
the Common Front" (1987) 12 Queen's LJ. 277 at 281-83; and C. L Smith, "Adding a Third Dimension:
The Canadian Approach to Constitutional Equality Guarantees" (1992) 55 Law & Contemp. Probs,
21M
46 Supra note 5.
49 R.S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III. The Canadian Bill of Rights is an ordinary
statute and therefore subject to repeal by Parliament, while the Charter is a constitutional document
governed by a special amending formula involving the provincial legislatures as well
JO [1979]1 S.C.R. 183.
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activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups.'
51
As C. Lynn Smith has written on theAndrews case,
[t]he Court therefore escaped formalism by rejecting the 'similarly situated' test and adding
the dimension of 'disadvantage' to the measurement of equality, In determining whether or
not to uphold allegedly discriminatory legislation, Canadian courts no longer limit their
analysis to whether the claimant and the treatment are sufficiently similar to or different from
selected comparators. Instead, the Court will consider whether the claimant is a member of a
group which has experienced persistent disadvantage on the basis of a personal
characteristic ... and whether the questioned classification continues or worsens the
disadvantage. 52
In other words, the inquiry pursuant to section 15 is purposive 53 and
remedial. Smith has summarized the emergent approach succinctly:
At the core of its approach to equality rights in these decisions is the kind of simple yet
profound insight that the concept of 'equity' exemplifies in the law of remedies. The
insight-embodied in what I refer to as the 'equality principle'-is that equality rights are
constitutionally guaranteed in order to counterbalance certain types of inequalities between
people. They are not primarily designed to address 'inequality' in a generic or abstract
sense. 54
III. JOINT CUSTODY IN CANADA
Before considering the implications of the emergent Canadian
equality ideology for joint custody, it will be useful to review briefly the
current legal treatment of joint custody in Canada. In Canada, both the
provincial and federal levels of government deal with custody.55 In spite of
strong lobbying on the part of fathers' rights groups, who argued that their
equality rights as guaranteed by the Charter entitle them to a legislated
51 Supra note 5 at 171.
2 Smith, supra note 47 at 222-23.
53 The Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of the Charter has consistently been
"purposive." See, for example, Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation
Branch) v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (sub nom. Hunter v. Southam), which addressed the
section 8 right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure; and R v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295 at 344, which considered the issue of Sunday closing laws and freedom of religion.
54 Smith, supra note 47 at 211. For another excellent discussion of the equality theory being
developed in Canada, see K Mahoney, "The Constitutional Law of Equality in Canada" (1992) 44 Me.
L Rev. 229.
5 The shared jurisdiction arises because under the ConsttutionAct,1867(U.K.),30&31V'c.,c.
3, ss. 91 and 92, the Parliament of Canada has the power to enact laws relating to marriage and divorce
(s. 91(26)), but the provinces have the power to legislate on the solemnization of marriage (s. 92(12)), and
property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).
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presumption ofjoint custody,56 such proposals have been rejected. Now,
however, the courts issuing orders pursuant to the federal DivorceAct 57or
provincial family law clearly have the option to award joint physical or legal
custody. Section 16(4) of the Act provides that a court may award custody
to "one or more persons."58 Provincial law, however, varies. The Civil Code
of Quebec, as interpreted by the jurisprudence, provides that both parents
retain what the common law recognizes as joint legal custody over children.
Article 647 of the Code stipulates that parental authority comprises the
rights of physical custody, supervision, and education. Until 1977, parental
authority was referred to as paternal authority (puissance paternelle)
The leading decision on the issue of parental authority is C.(G.) v. V-
F.(T.).59 In that case, the Supreme Court commented upon this civil law
notion, an effect of filiation. The Court held that an award of custody
removes from the non-custodial parent the exercise of custody (garde), but
not the enjoyment (jouissance) thereof. 60 Thus, if the custodial parent dies,
custody is automatically transferred to the other parent, who has retained
parental authority all along.
Some common law provincial statutes contain presumptions of joint
custody rebuttable on proof that such an arrangement would be contrary to
the best interests of the child. 61 Prince Edward Island has enacted a statute
providing that following a separation, parents have joint legal custody until
a separation agreement or court order otherwise provides. 62 The statute
56 References tothe Chaner, equality, and discrimination may be found throughout the testimony
of the fathers' rights groups. See House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs,
Minutes of Proceeding and Evidence, Nos. 32-50 (11 June 1985 to 23 October 1985), and some excerpts
from this testimony inf& note 68.
57 R.S.C. 1985 (2d Supp.), c. 3 [hereinafter the DivorceAct].
58 Section 16(4) of the Divorce Act reads: "The Court may make an order under this section
granting custody of, or access to, any or all children of the marriage to any one or more persons"
9 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 244 [hereinaftr C(G.)].
/ Jba at 265.
61/bid. at 265. See the Children'Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 2Z s. 30(4):
In any proceedings in respect of custody of a child between the mother and the father of
that child, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the court ought to award the care of
the child to one parent or the other and that all other parental rights associated with
custody of the child ought to be shared by the mother and the father jointly.
Section 18(4) of the Family Maintenance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 160 has been interpreted as a
presumption of joint custody, rebuttable on evidence that this would not be in the best interests of the
child. For interpretations of this statute, see Hemeon v. Deamel (1992), 117 N.S.R. (2d) 260 (Fai. Ct.)
[hereinafter Hemeon] discussed infra note 92; and Murray v. Murray (1989), 93 N.S.R. (2d) 66 (Fain.
CL) [hereinafterMuray].
W Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, RtS.PE.L 1988, c. C-33, s. 3.
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does not state what the court requires to issue a contrary order.&
Saskatchewan has recently enacted legislation that explicitly states that the
parents are joint legal custodians of their children.64 This presumption,
however, is weaker than it appears, because the general statement reflects
the respective rights of the parents during the marriage and, accordingly,
seems to amount to a statement of principle, which, unlike the Prince
Edward Island statute, says little about what happens upon separation. In
addition, the general principle is subject to a number of significant
exceptions, including agreement of the parties and court orders. Moreover,
the prevailing principle governing the judge in making an order remains the
best interests of the child. 65 Manitoba struck an interesting compromise in
the face of intense lobbying for joint custody presumptions. It did not enact
such a presumption, but in addressing the concerns of non-custodial parents
who felt excluded, it provided that they retain, unless otherwise ordered, a
right "to receive school, medical, psychological, dental and other reports
affecting the child."66
The federal DivorceAct also governs custody determinations upon
divorce and allows, but does not presume, joint custody. 67 In short, a review
of the provincial and federal statutory provisions reveals that most have
undergone revision within the last decade to permit or facilitate joint
custody. But despite the push for legislative reform in the direction of joint
custody which has taken place largely on the initiative of fathers' rights
lobbyists, 68 the courts have remained the central institutions for the
64 Children's LawAct, S.S. 1990-91, c. C-8.1. Section 3 (1) reads as follows: "Unless otherwise
ordered by the court and subject to subsection (2) and an agreement pursuant to subsection (3), the
parents of a child are joint legal custodians of the child with equal rights, powers and duties."
65 The Saskatchewan statute, ibid., nevertheless, contains at section 8(c) a specific prohibition
against a tender years doctrine or maternal preference. It states that, in deciding upon custody, the
court shall "make no presumption and draw no inference as between parents that one parent should
be preferred over the other on the basis of a person's status as a father or mother." This reflects the
concern that judges discriminate against fathers in custody determinations.
66 Family MaintenanceAct , RtS.M. 1987, c. F-20, s. 39(4). The DivorceAct, supra note 57, has a
similar provision at s.16 (5): "Unless the court orders otherwise, a spouse who is granted access to a child
of the marriage has the right to make inquiries and to be given information, as to the health, education
and welfare of the child."
67 Supra note 57 and accompanying text. The Ontario Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. C. 12, has a similar provision at section 28(a): "The court to which an application is made under
section 2 by order may grant the custody of or access to the child to one or more persons."
68 Members of various fathers' rights groups testified before the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, supra note 56. They adapted the discourse of discrimination
and equality, used by women's and civil rights groups since the 1960s, to their cause; namely, the
enactment of a joint legal custody presumption. For example, on June 13,1985, Mr. Pancres Nagy, of
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interpretation and application of custody norms. 69 This is partly because the
prevailing standard for custody determination is the notoriously
indeterminate best interests of the child test. Even when legislation
expressly permits joint custody, 70 courts have had to grapple with the
question of when it is in the best interests of the child.
In practice, court ordered joint custody, whether under federal or
provincial law, almost always means joint legal custody. 71 Such
arrangements may not be any different in practice from the traditional sole
custody and access arrangements, although, as many feminists have
pointed out, joint legal custody may encourage and legitimize continuing
interference by the father in the mother's life, particularly because her life
and decisions will be intertwined with those of her children. 72
the Association des hommes separes ou divorces de Montreal, said,
Our society was based ... on sexual prejudice. Women had all sorts of disadvantages in the
workplace, in salary scales and promotion. The discrimination was based on the assumption
that they belonged to the home and the family. But this stereotype which produced
discrimination against women also produced discrimination in favour of women, not many,
but in many very important areas [custody among them]. (34:22)
On June 20,1985, Mr. Brian Demaine, the Co-Director of Fathers for Equality in Divorce, said: "If
the full spirit of section 15 of the Charter is fearlessly instilled into the final version of Bill C-47, the
Canadian divorce law will at last be cleansed of its most outrageously anti-male legislation still extant
and all Canadians will be far more equal than they are today" (38:38). Earlier, Mr. Demaine had argued
that the Committee would "not.- hear any more extensive and blatant examples of overt discrimination
in this democracy than of the prejudice against divorced fathers in Canada today" (38:37).
Members of Parliament were quick to assume that joint custody was in the best interests of the
child, even though they were aware of the lack of research to substantiate that assertion. Hence, on
October 23,1985, Mr. John Nunziata, an MP for the Liberal Party, said:
We know there are no existing statistics in Canada to support the idea that joint custody is
better than sole custody. But I think it is obvious that when we speak of the best interests of
the child the love and affection of both parents and the involvement of both parents in the
upbringing of the child are in the best interests of the child. There is no question in my mind.
(5031)
For more on fathers' rights activists, especially their testimony before the Subcommittee on
Equality Rights of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, see G. Dulac, "Le Lobby des
pares, divorce, et paternit6," (1989) 3 CJ.W.L. 45.
G It should also be noted that as the Manitoba reforms illustrate, the notion of sole custody has
evolved as well and does not carry the absolute, exclusive parental control that it was once thought to.
See Hines v. Hines (1992), 40 R.F.L. (3d) 274 (N.S.) and the annotation by J.G. McLeod, who argues
that the distinction between joint legal custody and sole custody with parental access is blurring.
;0 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
71 See, for example, Colwell, supra note 8. B. Hovius, in Family Law: Cases, Notes and
Materials, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 751 (vote 2) mentions two cases in which joint custody was
used in the sense of joint physical custody: Huber v. Huber (1975), 18 R.F.L 378 (Sask. Q.B.); and
Donald v. Donald (1980), 3 Sask. R. 202 (Q.B.). Recent cases specifyjoint physical custody or use the
term, "divided custody."
72 See AM. Delorey, "Joint Legal Custody. A Reversion to Patriarchal Power" (1989) 3 CJ.W.L
33 at 4042. WVeitzman argues that joint custody has allowed men to retain power over their former wives
after separation. In her view, it gives men a veto over women's decisions and therefore allows men to
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An important question has been avoided to a surprising extent
during the joint custody debate, and that is how joint legal custody differs-if
at all-from sole custody. Does a parent who has been awarded sole
custody thereby acquire all decision-making power over the children to the
exclusion of the other parent? For L'Heureux-Dub6 J., writing in Young v
Young, this was a key question. 73 The basic issue in Young was whether a
court order, which placed restrictions on the extent to which a non-custodial
father could involve the children in his religion during visits, constituted a
violation of his religious freedom under the Charter. L'Heureux-Dub6 J.,
holding that the Charter does not apply to custody matters, forcefully
expressed the view that the only issue in custody and access is the best
interests of the child, and not the rights of the parents. Parents have rights
under the law, she asserted, to the extent that these rights permit the
parents to act in the best interests of their children. She argued persuasively
that sole custodians require such decision-making authority-in order to
protect the interests of their children effectively, and that the law recognizes
this exclusive authority on the part of sole custodians:
It has long been recognized that the custodial parent has a duty to ensure, protect and
promote the best interests of the child. That duty includes the sole and primary responsibility
to oversee all aspects of day-to-day life and long-term well-being, as well as major decisions
with respect to education, religion, health and well-being. 74
Further on, she continued:
The perception that upholding the authority of the custodial parent emphasizes the rights of
the parent at the expense of the interests of the child misconceives the problem. It is precisely
to ensure the best interests of the child that the decision-making power is granted to the
custodial parent, as that person is uniquely situated to assess, understand, ensure and
veto their lifestyles: Weitzman, supra note 10 at 361. C. Smart, in Smart & Sevenhuijsen, supra note 30
at 21, makes the same point. But see Maccoby and Mnookin, supra note 7 at 289, where the authors
report finding that mothers with joint legal custody who were primary residential parents were the
decision makers regarding the children.
73 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Young]. The Court was unanimous in finding that the grant of
discretion conferred to trial judges through the application of the best interests test according to
Sections 16(8) and 17(5) of the DivorceAc4 supra note 57, did not infringe the Charter guarantees of
freedom of religion and expression. On the issue of the restrictive order imposed by the trial judge on Mr.
Young's access, the majority (L'Heureux-Dube, LaForest, and Gonthier JJ. dissenting) held that the
appeal with respect to the restrictions should be dismissed, and the decision of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal removing the restrictions should be afrmed. The restrictions imposed by the trial judge
included, inter alia, that Mr. Young would be prohibited from taking his children canvassing, or to
religious services and meetings, and that he would be restricted in the extent to which he could discuss
the Jehovah's Witness religion with his children.
74 bid. at 38. L'Heureux-Dub6 also refers to the parallel situation in Quebec pursuant to arts.
647 and 569-70 of the Civil Code of Quebec. She refers to C (G.), supra note 59, at 280, in which Beetz
J. held that the effect of a custody award is to remove the right of the non-custodial parent to exercise
his or her parental authority.
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promote the needs of the child. This, of course is also consistent with the fact that the
custodial parent bears both the legal obligation to care for the child and the legal liability for
the child's acts. 15
It is crucial to note at the outset that L'Heureux-Dub6's judgment, in
favouring sole legal custody, cannot be treated as the law of the land. X
Only LaForest and Gonthier JJ. concurred with this opinion as a whole, and
the other judgments, of Cory and lacobucci JJ., did not address this issue at
all. Sopinka J., for example, does not discuss this point, but expresses other
views, which tend to suggest that the custodial parent should have exclusive
decision-making authority. McLachlin J.'s judgment, to the extent that she
emphasizes the continuing roles of both parents following divorce, tends to
be directly antithetical to the view expressed by L'Heureux-Dub6 J.,
although McLachlin J. does not expressly discuss this point in depth. For the
purpose of our discussion on joint custody, however, it is clear that
L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s view is that the best interests of the child are generally
served better by sole custody.
It remains open to question whether a parent with sole custody has
exclusive decision-making authority with respect to the children, although the
issue has recently also arisen in the so-called "mobility rights" cases. 77
These cases arise when the custodial parent wishes to move, typically
because of remarriage or employment relocation. Under older case law,
determining which parent had sole custody would have resolved the issue. 7
Recently, the courts have considered whether there is a non-removal clause
in the court order or agreement between the parties, and whether the
parent who wishes to move is doing so for legitimate reasons. The courts
seem to be hesitant to allow a parent to move with the children when the
motivation behind the move is to sever or diminish the relationship between
the children and the other parent. For present purposes, the interesting
point is that the mere characterization of the custody arrangement as
"sole" rather than "joint" does not dispose of the issue, even
75 Young, supra note 73 at 51-52.
76 For example, McLachlin J.'s opinion presupposes the contrary view, although she does not
expressly discuss the point in depth, as does L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
77 See, for example, Carter v. Brooks (1990), 30 R.F.L. (3d) 53 (Ont. CA); Co/fy v. Co/!O, (1991),
31 R.F.L (3d) 281 (Ont. U.F.C.); and Fasan v. Fasan (1991), 32 R.F.L (3d) 121 (Ont. Gen. Div.). For
a summary of earlier decisions, see H. Niman, "Custody, Access and Parental Mobility Rights" (1989) 4
Can. Faro. L.Q. 95.
78 See, for example, Wight v. Wright (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 337 (CA); and Fld v. Fd (1978), 6
R.J_ (2d) 278 (f.CJ.).
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presumptively.79 In light of L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s discussion on the point in
Young, the most that can be said is that the lines have been drawn.
The issue of the relationship between the best interests of the child
and the rights of the parents arose squarely in Young 8OandP.(D.) v.
S. (C), 81 and unfortunately, no consensus emerged. In Young and P. (D.), a
clear majority of the Court held that custody and access issues should be
determined on the basis of the best interests standard and not on the basis
of parental rights. There was, however, considerable disagreement as to
what would suffice to show that the best interests of the child justified a
restriction of access affecting the father's religious activities. In Young, the
trial judge had imposed an order which provided that the father could not
take the children to religious services or meetings, or take them canvassing.
In addition, it restricted him from discussing the Jehovah's Witness religion
with the children.8 2 L' Heureux-Dub6 J. (with LaForest and Gonthier JJ.
concurring) held that the Charter does not apply to parents in the family
context, although Charter values should remain an important consideration
in judicial decision-making. Her decision arguably represents the high-water
mark of a child-centred approach, because her analysis would render it
juridically irrelevant that the impugned order significantly affected the
religious activities of the father, and restricted him from discussing the
Jehovah's Witness religion with the children. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. cited
expert opinion, evidence the trial judge had accepted, that the religious
dimensions of the visits were upsetting to the children. This expert opinion
agreed with her finding that the "best interests of these children were
served by removing the source of conflict." 83 She was unequivocal in her
view that the interests of the children, as presumptively determined by the
custodial parent, and not the rights of the parents, should form the exclusive
core of such determinations. Cory and Iacobucci JJ. agreed that what is in
the best interest of the child should determine the issue of access. They
;9 This is another example of the effects of the indeterminacy of the best interests tests in custody
and related issues. Increasing numbers of authors are calling for presumptions, and particularly primary
caretaker presumptions, to avoid providing incentives to litigate. Indeed, empirical research is showing
more litigation in jurisdictions that have the best interests standard as opposed to those with
presumptions: see Bookspan, supra note 11. Similar problems arise with the incidents of custody and will
continue to do so unless the courts similarly create greater certainty in dealing with them. In some states,
a custody arrangement will specify which parent has the ultimate say on certain issues, such as religion.
An alternative is to resort to presumptions at this level as well by giving the custodial parent the
presumptive right to make certain decisions so long as the custodial parent does so in good faith.
M Supra note 73.
81 [1993]4 S.C.R. 141 [hereinafterP.(D.)].
82 Supra note 73.
83 Ik at 104.
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disagreed, however, with the finding that the best interests test could
preclude the non-custodial father from even discussing religion with the
children.84 The underlying rationale seems to be based on their view that it
was unlikely that religious discussions (as opposed to indoctrination) would
be contrary to the best interests of the children. McLachlin J. concluded that,
although the ultimate criterion for determining limits on access to a child is
the best interests of the child, it would be necessary to establish harm or risk
of harm to the children to ensure that the restrictions on access did not
unduly infringe the father's religious freedom. In her view, the trial judge's
concern that the father's relationship with the children would continue to
deteriorate if he persisted in his religious instruction during his periods of
access was not a sufficient reason for restricting access.85 Her analysis,
then, arguably shifts the focus of inquiry in the direction of (parental) rights
discourse, in the sense that the nature of the parental interest or right in
question is directly relevant and can change the standard applicable to the
child. Sopinka J.'s view, however, is perhaps the most difficult to digest: he
agreed that the standard is the best interests of the child, but asserted that it
must be reconciled with the Charter. In the result, this removed the
restriction on the father from discussing his religion with the children.
At first glance, P. (D.) 86 seems more straightforward than Young, if
only because the lead judgement, written by L'Heureux-Dub6 J., attracted
a more coherent base of support; the only dissenters were McLachlin and
Sopinka JJ. The facts were very similar to those in Young. The mother, the
custodial parent, was a Roman Catholic, while the father had converted to
become a Jehovah's Witness. The two cases mainly differ in the orders
made at trial and in the treatment of the evidence by the appeal courts.
First, the order in P. (D.) specified that the father could teach his faith to the
child but also specified that he could not "indoctrinate" her. The order had
not prohibited the father from discussing his religion with his child, unlike the
trial judge's order in Young. Second, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court both emphasized the trial judge's observation that "the main problem
for the child results from the applicant's religious fanaticism" and that such
religious fanaticism was disturbing to such a young girl.8 7 As in Young,
Gonthier and LaForest JJ. concurred with L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s reasons,
which track those she wrote in Young. The starting points are the pre-
eminence of the best interests of the child, along with the view that the
84 id. at 110.
5 Ibid. at 129.
85 Supra note 81.
&7Jb at 152.
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custodial parent retains presumptive decision-making authority concerning
the children. The greater degree of consensus among the Court in P. (D.),
however, was due to Cory J.'s reasons with which Iacobucci J. concurred.
Cory J. agreed that the lower court's decision had clearly established that
the restrictions imposed would serve the best interests of the child. This is
quite consistent with his reasons in Young, which expressed great concern
about the restrictions placed on the father respecting even the discussion of
his religion with the children. The order in P. (D.) had not gone so far, but
instead stipulated that the father refrain from "indoctrinating" the children.
Nevertheless, all the judgements, except the dissents, raise a red flag in a
broader sense. The trial judge's finding of harm was based on the fact that,
first of all, the parents practised very different religions and second, on the
"religious fanaticism" of the father. Regarding the first point, McLachlin J.
correctly noted that all of the judges below seemed to have been willing to
infer harm from the mere presence of conflict between the parents on the
issue of religion. Indeed, unlike the situation in Young, no evidence existed
to suggest that the child was adversely affected at all by exposure to her
father's religious zeal. Upon returning home, she would repeatedly refer to
"Jehovah," and told her mother that her father had said that it was wrong
to celebrate Hallowe'en and Christmas, but no evidence suggested that the
child was disturbed by this at all. Regarding the second point, the trial judge
seemed to have based the finding of "religious fanaticism," arguably a
loaded phrase, on little more than the fact that the father was a committed
Jehovah's Witness. This raises the concern that the identity and level of
social acceptability of particular religions might drive findings as to what
constitued harm or the best interests of the children. One wonders, for
example, if a committed Roman Catholic would be so readily considered a
fanatic. Moreover, it is unclear from a consideration of Young and P. (D.)
whether, or to what extent, a best interests standard really differs from a
harm standard.
What can we conclude from Young and P. (D.) ? On one hand, we
can conclude very little. It is very difficult to extract any degree of
consensus on any of the legal issues before the Court. No broad consensus
emerged on the legal authority of a sole custodian or an access parent, nor
on the precise relevance of a constitutionally guaranteed parental right to
access determination. This difficulty increases when one attempts to apply
the various reasons to the facts of the cases and the reasons of the courts
below. On the other hand, we can make a few general observations, which
are useful in locating the decision within the tradition of custody decision-
making in Canada. The key point is that the judges all agreed that the
Wbid. at 196.
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ultimate standard was the best interests test. Problematic as this test is
(and the facts of these cases could serve as a graphic indicator of this), the
durability of the best interests test is at least a potent symbol of the idea
that the child should remain at the centre of the debate. Young does not
support the view that a discourse of parental rights should hijack custody
and access issuesf 9
What, then, can we say about the state of the law on joint custody in
Canada? Although custody decisions are notoriously case-specific,
indeterminate (some would say), and therefore inconclusive, a number of
comments can be made. Joint custody, when granted, is generally framed in
terms of the best interests of the child. 90 The rationale is that as ongoing
contact and involvement with both parents is good, joint custody is better,
and, therefore, joint custody is in the best interests of the child.91 Judges
rarely refer explicitly to equal parental rights as a reason for awarding
joint custody,92 although the notion often lurks just below the surface. In
other words, although the notion of equal parental rights has clearly had
some influence, Canadian courts have preferred a more child-centred
approach to one centred on parental rights.93
N Although, it should be noted that McLachlin J.'s dissenting judgments in both cases might be
used to construct such an argument.
90 For example, even legislation that appears to enact a joint custody presumption stipulates that
the prevailing principle for judges to consider is the best interests of the child, and the enumerated
factors to be considered under this test often include primary caretaker considerations. For example,
see the Children's LawAct, supra note 64. Accordingly, the joint custody presumption, even where it
exists, is quite weak.
91 This is one of the leaps made on the basis of early empirical research. See John Nunziata's
comments on the advantages of joint custody: supra note 68.
92 But Hemeon, supra note 61 at 268, offers a striking illustration of this approach. Daley.
J.F.C, said:
Given s. 18(4) of the Family MaintenanceAct [supra note 61], the proper procedure in this
province in my view is to begin on the premise that joint entitlement to the child is the starting
point. In other words, the law gives both parents equal rights to the child and that is the
order to be made unless the welfare of the child requires a different order. In my view, an
equal entitlement custody order would have the burden of proving that it was not in the best
interests of the child to make an order recognizing this entitlement.
93 E. Canacakos, in "Joint Custody as a Fundamental Right" (1981) Ariz. L Rev. 785, provides
an illustration of the American concern about parental rights. The author argues that joint custody
must be ordered unless the party opposed can prove that this would cause harm to the child. This
agreement is based on the constitutional doctrine of "parental autonomy," as elaborated in cases
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The doctrine requires that both
parents be allowed to continue to have rights over their children unless an overriding state interest exists
to prevent this. Canacakos cites, at 791, Quiloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) at 255, and Poe v.
U//man, 367 US. 497 (1961) at 551-52 (per Harlan J, dissenting) in support of her proposition. Because
fundamental rights are at stake, a presumption rebuttable upon satisfaction that joint custody would
not, on a balance of probabilities, be in the best interests of the child, would be unacceptable. Counsel
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The continuing dominance of a child-centred approach is illustrated
by the fact that, in spite of some of the legislative provisions mentioned
above which appear to enact joint custody presumptions, our courts have
been very reluctant to give joint custody to spouses whose history indicates
an inability to cooperate. 94 Canadian courts have also been generally
reluctant to award joint custody when one of the parents is opposed to such
an order, even if the parents have not been locked in bitter combat. 95 A
1986 Manitoba Court of Appeal decision, however, stated that "as a
matter of common sense ... the mere expression of an unwillingness to share
custody should not preclude an order of joint custody if the court considers
such unwillingness to be the manifestation of temporary personal hostility
engendered by the trauma of a recent separation."96 This decision seems
to presuppose that joint custody should be the norm, and appears to be
willing to run the risk of continuing the conflict between the parents, which is
likely to affect the children adversely. 97 Nevertheless, even in this case,
for the father in Young, supra note 73, presented similar arguments.
W For a discussion of this, see J.D. Payne & B. Edwards, "Cooperative Parenting After Divorce:
A Canadian Legal Perspective" in Joint Custody and Shared Parenting, supra note 1 at 285. Parrett J.,
in Poulinv. Poulin, [1993] C.CJ. No. 1054 (QL) (B.C.) at 8, writes:
For ... joint custody to work there must be a level of mutual respect, an ability to
communicate, and the vision to see, independent of their own interests, the best interests of
the children. Where these qualities are present, the parents can function jointly while
minimizing their own conflict to ease the burden on .. the children. Such a process maintains
the relationship with both parents, but the key to its success is the absence of the conflict
between the parents which adds immeasurably to the difficult adjustments faced by the
children. Where these qualities are absent, joint custody and joint guardianship are a recipe
for disaster, placing the children at the center of the conflict, prolonging it and removing any
process of effective decision making.
Some disturbing decisions do award joint custody in such cases, but these seem to have been few
and far between. In Teiglerv. Santiago (1984), 2 F.LR.R. 86 (Ont. CA.), the Court ordered monthly
alternating residence despite the parents' quarelling. Joint custody was ordered because it appeared to
suit the child. See also Faun v. Faunt (1988), 12 RFL (3d) 331 (Alta. CA). Despite the father's lack
of agreement (he wanted sole custody), the Court ordered joint custody (in the form of annual
alternating residences)-an arrangement to which the parents had earlier agreed.
95 The authority usually cited for this proposition is Kruger v. Kruger (1979), 11 R.F.L. 232 (Ont.
CA), in which Thorson J.A. stated that a court should be guided by the precept that parents should
try such an arrangement only when both are willing, thoughtful, and mature, and understand what is
involved.
95 Abbott v. Taylor (1986), 28 D.LR. (4th) 125 at 132. Twaddle JA. justified this by explaining
that to say otherwise should encourage one parent to avoid the participation of the other in deciding
questions as to their child's future by a mere statement of willingness to share the responsibility. This
case, along with the frequently cited case of Heyman v. Heyman (1990), 24 R.F.L. (3d) 402 (B.C.)
[hereinafter Heyman], suggests that in Western Canada parental agreement may no longer be a sine
qua non of joint custody.
97 See the discussion above at note 16.
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Twaddle J.A., writing for the Court, awarded the ultimate decision-making
authority (the Manitoba equivalent to sole legal custody) to the mother.
To summarize, then, there is room for some debate over the
direction of the trend regarding joint custody in Canada. Although
legislation is still being revised to facilitate joint custody awards, courts
continue to be rather circumspect in making such awards. Moreover, as
discussed above, the lines differentiating joint legal custody and sole custody
have been, and continue to be, difficult to draw. It seems clear, however,
that the courts continue to approach custody issues from a largely child-
centred perspective, rather than from a parental rights perspective.98 This
view finds some support in that the rights-based arguments of fathers'
rights proponents have failed in Canada in some crucial respects. Most
jurisdictions, and most importantly, the federal parliament, have refused to
enact joint custody presumptions. In so refusing, they have refused to adopt
the notion that custody should be allocated on the basis of the rights of the
parents. Rather, the inquiry remains centred on the child, although the
influence of the fathers' rights groups is clear. The point is that the heart of
the discourse has not shifted to one of parental rights. 99 I do not mean to
suggest, however, that the interests or rights of parents, such as substantive
equality or the religious views of a parent, should be irrelevant. But the
starting point of any inquiry involving children should be the children.
Certain fundamental values, such as religious freedom or equality,
will-and should-permeate our analysis and affect our understanding of
the issues, but should not drive the discourse and displace the children from
the centre of the inquiry.
IV. THE CANADIAN VISION OF EQUALITY AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR JOINT CUSTODY
What are the implications of the emergent Canadian equality
ideology for joint custody? First, and most importantly, the displacement of
the sameness approach from the core of equality also displaces the
98 In Hume v. Hume, [1989] P.E.IJ. No. 75 (QL), a father, petitioning for joint custody,
complained of discrimination and resorted to equality based arguments to support his case. Matheson
J. dismissed these arguments, expressing the opinion that they were based on his interests, and not his
children's as they should have been.
9) This is illustrated in C.(G.), supra note 59, in which the custody dispute was between a father,
alienated from his children, and an aunt and uncle, with whom the children had been living since the
mother's death. Although the father retained his parental authority, which can only be removed for
serious cause, i-, abandonment, abuse or neglect, and the right to supervise and be informed, the Court
awarded physical custody to the aunt and uncle on the basis of the best interests of the child.
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appealing moral basis of joint custody, which is the idea that parents should
be treated alike. Put another way, equality no longer provides instant
legitimacy for joint custody. Over the past few years, a number of feminist
writers publishing in Canada have expressed concern over the possible
effects of the ideology of equality on women in the context of child custody.
In 1989, Susan Boyd wrote as follows:
In the context of child custody decisions, the judiciary may be increasingly influenced by an
'ideology of equality' which assumes that since women and men have been granted formal
equality by the Charter and are not distinguished between in the 'best interests of the child'
standard, they are now equal in the wider social and economic context. If so, judges (who
often express publicly their reluctance to 'choose' between parents in custody cases) may
ignore real differences in the life situations of most mothers and fathers by first assuming the
social and economic equality of women and men, and then applying apparently gender
neutral standards such as 'stability' and 'continuity' which may prejudice the chances of
mothers in being awarded custody. ... A second reaction by the judiciary might be to opt for
joint custody and to encourage mediation as easy methods of expressing equality of
parentsl00
Boyd, a Canadian, expresses a serious concern, but seems to allow for the
possibility of a notion of equality that does not insist on masking the
differences between mothers and fathers. Martha Fineman, an American,
seems to be more pessimistic about the possibilities, seeing equality as an
ideology that minimizes or discounts difference and reinforces the historical
oppression of women. Accordingly,
The ideology of gender equality has provided the theoretical and normative framework for
much of the discourse surrounding reform in custody rules. This paradigm is appealing both
because it is relatively simple, and its reference to the theoretically dominant ideology of
equality corresponds with other developments in human rights, such as the paradigm of racial
equality. A gender-neutral framework, however, masks real inequalities between men and
women. Gender-neutral rules are applied in a gendered world to gendered lives.... To the
extent that the dictates of equality theory treat gender as irrelevant to social policy, then
that equality theory is flawed and incomplete.1 01
Fineman's critique of equality may already have been anticipated in
Canada, for as I have discussed above, the vision of equality that is
emerging in Canada does take difference into account, not merely as an
exception, but as part of the central core of the concept. Accordingly, joint
custody is less likely to hold sway in Canada than it has had in jurisdictions
such as California.
This vision of equality has found expression in a number of recent
cases in which Charter provisions were not directly at issue. In these cases,
the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted equality to mean something
100 SB. Boyd, "Child Custody, Ideologies, and Employment" (1989), 3 CJ.W.L. 111 at 124.
101 Fimeman, supra note 24 at 90-91.
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other than formal equality or sameness of treatment. The cases may
offer some hints as to the approach that would be taken to custody issues.
First, in Lavalle, 102 the Supreme Court of Canada expanded the legal
parameters of self-defence in order that the notion of "reasonableness"
could include the circumstances of a battered woman, who, afraid that her
spouse would kill her later that night, shot him in the back of the head as he
left the room. As Wilson 3. wrote, the test had previously been based on the
parameters of the bar-room brawl, requiring that the threat be "imminent,"
a requirement that, if simply applied to women, would amount to death
sentences for most women who are physically smaller and weaker than
their spouses. In other words, the judgement took into account differences in
the social and physical realities of men and women. Second, and very
recently, the Supreme Court in Moge v. Moge103 considered the different
social realities that women face as a significant factor in assessing spousal
support following divorce. In holding that economic self-sufficiency is merely
one objective of support orders and not a pre-eminent one, L'Heureux-
Dub6 . quoted Twaddle J.A.'s decision, which stated that "[e]conomic self-
sufficiency may be appropriate for a wife who has had the same
opportunities as her husband, but it surely leads to inequality for one who
lacked them." 1°4 The readiness of the Canadian Supreme Court to lift the
veil of formal equality suggests that joint custody is unlikely to be seen as a
necessary or even as a desirable incident of the notion of equality.
L'Heureux-Dub6 . observed in Young albeit in obiter dicta, that social
reality remains some distance from the ideals of equality and shared
parenting:
But the reality of divorce and the circumstances of the parties cannot easily be dismissed.
When implementing the objectives of the [Divorce I Ad, whether considering joint custody or
fashioning access orders, courts, in my view, must be conscious of the gap between the ideals
of shared parenting and the social reality of custody and child care decisions. Despite the
neutrality of the Aa, forces such as wage rates, job ghettos and socialization about care-
giving still operate in a manner that cause many women to "choose" to take on the care.
giving role both during marriage and after divorce. Hence, "we remain a good distance away
102 Supra note 40.
103 [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 [hereinafter Moge]. In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, (1990) 64 Man. R. (2d) 172 (CA), which reversed an order of the trial
division, (1989) 60 Man. R. (2d) 281 (Q.B.), terminating support payments to a woman.
104 ]bid. at 829. More precisely, the Court held that, according to the DivorceAc4 supra note 57,
c. D-3.4, where there has been no agreement as to maintenance following divorce, the Court must not
seek to make economic self-sufficiency a pre-eminent objective. According to the Court, self-sufficiency
is an objective among others-one that should only be pursued where practicable. The Supreme Court
decision in Moge restricts the scope of the application of the famous trilogy of divorce cases (Pelech v.
Pelech, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801; Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857; and Caron v. Carmn, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 892), which had emphasized the importance of achieving self-sufficiency as soon as possible.
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from the kind of equality which would make decisions between mothers and fathers as to
who is going to leave the work-force to care for young children truly gender neutral."10
To the extent that fathers are treated differently in custody decisions, the
difference arises from the differences which generally exist in the social
reality of parenting roles. In spite of the return of women in large numbers
to the workplace, and in spite of the rhetoric about domestic equality and
job-sharing, study after study has shown that women still perform the lion's
share of domestic and child-rearing tasks. 105 The adoption of norms such
as joint custody, which assume the equal division of child-care responsibilities
during marriage as a social norm, simply does not reflect reality. This has
been recently reinforced by the "mother drift" phenomenon, documented by
Maccoby and Mnookin.1 07 In addition, as some authors have argued, it
may perpetuate the subordination of women by depriving them of the one
arena of power they have traditionally possessed.108 These social realities
and differences are very much the sort that Canadian courts have shown a
willingness to consider (as cases such as Moge and LavalMe illustrate) but
which a sameness approach to equality is likely to suppress.
These cases then, and the values that underlie them, pave the way
for an analogous treatment of custody issues. Canadian courts are unlikely
to embrace the view that a father is entitled, even presumptively, to joint
custody as a matter of equality. First, as we have discussed, Canadians
tend to be rather less enthusiastic about rights discourse, and rather less
individualistic than their American neighbours. This seems to be even more
so in cases involving children where the best interests of the child test has
prevailed. The courts have recently explored the question of the
relationship between constitutional rights and the best interests of the child
standard in Young and P.(D.), but, as discussed above, this has raised more
questions than it has answered.
A second point relates to the argument that awards of sole custody
to mothers are discriminatory with respect to fathers, a common refrain
among fathers' rights activists. 1 09 Again, while this might have some appeal
according to the American equality tradition, it is more problematic in
105 Young, supra note 73 at 49.
106 Several of these studies are discussed by J. Drakich, "In Search of the Better Parent: The
Social Construction of Ideologies of Fatherhood" (1989) 3 CJ.W.L 69 at 83-85. The author argues
that, although film and other media often portray fathers as highly involved in their children's lives, these
portrayals do not correspond to the prevailing social reality.
107 Maccoby & Mnookin, supra note 7 at 93-97 and at 791.
108 See Smart in Smart & Sevenhuijsen, supra note 30.
109 See supra note 68.
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Canada. To begin with, it is now well established that mere difference of
treatment does not constitute inequality. Accordingly, that mothers more
often are awarded custody does not mean that fathers are discriminated
against. The courts have required some disadvantage in a social or
systemic sense to identify discrimination. Given that the studies show that
divorced fathers as a class do better financially than divorced mothers, and
that they are considerably more likely to remarry, this disadvantage would
be virtually impossible to show. 10 Although her judgement cannot be said to
reflect that of the rest of the Court, it is certainly clear that L'Heureux-
Dube J., as discussed above, would be unsympathetic to such arguments.
Canadian courts, as we saw above in the discussion of joint custody
in Canada, take an approach to custody which is both child-centred and
based in reality. As in the area of equality, custody is not a matter for the
application of abstract standards, but rather a determination which always
requires consideration of context. Put another way, the context is a central
part of the norm. The attitude of Canadian jurists suggests that any norm
rooted in an abstraction, without taking account of context and social
reality, is doomed to failure. The approach to joint custody in Canada
should not, then, be surprising. Even where joint legal custody is a
presumption, it gives way easily to the best interests of the child, as for
example, when the parents are unable to cooperate. Generally, joint
custody is an option, but one subject to a number of conditions, which require
a searching consideration of the circumstances when the parents are not in
agreement.
The problem that this raises is the following. Having made the
argument that a joint custody presumption would not be appropriate for the
Canadian legal and social climate, the question arises as to what the
appropriate standard should be. At the risk of being accused of avoiding
difficult question.s, I would reiterate that the purpose of this paper has been
to consider the values underlying joint custody and not to devise the ideal
custody standard. Having said this, however, either a primary caretaker
presumption or a maternal presumption (and I emphasize that this is a
presumption) would be preferable alternatives. Both, and especially the
maternal presumption, could reduce any incentive to litigate due to the
indeterminacy of a wide-open best interests standard or a joint custody
presumption. Custody blackmail, whether in subtle or overt form, would be
much less likely.
Both the maternal presumption and the primary caretaker
presumption have found persuasive advocates. Martha Fineman has
110 See Weitman, supra note 10 at 202 and at 322ff.
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advocated the primary caretaker presumption.111 Mary Ann Mason has
argued for a maternal presumption.m Although it is beyond the scope of
this paper to advocate one approach or another, it is important to recognize
that the primary caretaker presumption in the United States may originate
in the fear that the tender years doctrine was unconstitutional, and that a
maternal presumption would also be unconstitutional. Even in the United
States, it is not as clear as some have assumed that a gendered
presumption or test would be unconstitutional.11 3 The United States
Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue. The central point for Canada,
however, is that there is an argument to be made that, in light of the
emerging views on equality and in light of decisions such as Moge and
Lavalle, it cannot be assumed that a maternal presumption would be
unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
In Canada, the idea of joint custody has not been received by
legislators and judges with the same degree of enthusiasm that it has
enjoyed in the United States. I have suggested that this results, first of all,
from a different social and historical culture, and secondly, from a different
emerging notion of equality which itself arises out of the Canadian climate.
The result is that joint custody does not have the initial normative appeal
that it has enjoyed in the United States. As the focus on the social reality in
the context of equality illustrates, Canadian courts have relied heavily on
the reality of children's lives in the determination of custody, as well as in
their consideration of fundamental values, such as equality and religious
freedom. In this sense, the Canadian approach to equality is relevant in
two ways. First, as equality notions have formed the moral justification for
joint custody in the United States, the differences in Canadian equality
ideology may have implications for the appeal of joint custody in Canada.
Canadian courts have moved away from the sameness of treatment
model, which has permeated American law and, as I have argued,
influenced trends in custody both directly and indirectly. Second, the
Canadian approach to equality may be a metaphor for the approach to
custody and other issues generally. Canadian courts are somewhat less
individualistic in orientation and less willing to apply abstract standards in
111 Fineman, supra note 26 at 46.
112 Mason, supra note 15.
113 See Bookspan, supra note 11.
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the absence of a serious consideration of social context and social reality.
Equality and other fundamental values remain important but the sameness
approach to equality has been treated with scepticism and as one which
may even foster and perpetuate inequality.
Even in the United States, legislators and policy-makers are calling
for a return to more predictable custody standards which are more solidly
grounded in the daily social reality of the lives of children and their
parents 14 For the reasons I have discussed, and in particular, in the
absence of a pervasive sameness approach to equality, Canadians are
well placed to meet this challenge in the coming years.
114 See, for example, the California State Senate Task Force on Family Equity, supra note 2.
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